This paper develops a theoretical model to study features of the evolving ownership structures of private enterprises in Zhejiang Province, China. The model predicts that in a developing economy where the market environment is immature or unstable, the ownership structure of a typical private enterprise involves a cooperative arrangement between a party with management skills and another party with Guanxi (connections). As the market environment becomes more stable, the ownership share of the party with management skills increases. This result is confirmed by empirical evidence of 296 surveyed firms in Ningbo city of China, showing that the perceived importance of both government and family Guanxi declined with perceived improvements in market stability.
Introduction
Since the beginning of the market-oriented reforms in 1978, China has enjoyed extraordinary economic growth for over 30 years. During this period, China's stunning economic performance has been accompanied and most likely propelled by the rapid expansion of its private sector, particularly after the government recognized the non-public sector as an important part of the socialist market economy in the late 1990s. The number of registered private enterprises jumped from less than one million in 1997 to 8.18 million in 2010, and the private sector is estimated to contribute to about 70 per cent of GDP in recent years. [4] Indeed, the rise of the private sector in China has fuelled rapid economic growth during the last three decades, and private firms are the most dynamic component of the Chinese economy.
The top 3 provinces that host the most private enterprises are Jiangsu province, Guangdong province and Zhejiang province. However the [4] Calculations based on data from Statistical Year Book of China 2011 and Yearbook of State's Industrial and Commercial Administration 2011.
features of private sector development are different across these provinces. For example, in southern Jiangsu province, many private enterprises are spinoffs from state and collective enterprises. In the Pearl River Delta region of Guangdong province, private enterprises are often supported by capital from Hong Kong, Macao and other developed economies. In contrast, the private sector in Zhejiang province has grown spontaneously, relying mainly on capital accumulation from the owners' personal savings and retained earnings. We focus on the spontaneous private sector growth of the 'Zhejiang type' in this paper.
The growth of the private sector in Zhejiang province may be thought as a geographical expansion of the Wenzou model frequently cited in the literature (Yuan, 1987; Sun, 2000; Zhang et al., 2002) . Wenzhou is a prefecture-level municipality located in the southeast corner of Zhejiang province. From a relatively unknown city in the 1970s, Wenzhou has achieved national fame for its star economic performance by mid-1980s, and has continued to enjoy outstanding growth. Between 1978 and 2008 Wenzhou's real GDP increased from RMB1.3 billion to RMB86.5 billion (USD12.5 billion in 2008), an average annual growth of 15%. The main driver of growth has been the expansion of the private sector. In fact, 98% of all the industrial firms in Wenzhou are privately owned (The China General Chamber of Commerce, 2009, pp.183-184) .
Like the case with Wenzhou city, the story of private sector development in other parts of Zhejiang province is one of "reforming from below." Private sector developed as a result of individuals, households, and local government officials pursuing their pragmatic interests, rather than following 'top-down' directives (Sun, 2000) . Of course, individual pursuits are not carried out in a vacuum, but are constrained by the policy environment. From the late 1970s to the mid-1980s, there was considerable uncertainty regarding private property rights, and government policies (e.g., allocation of resources, loan approvals, tax treatment and bank loans) clearly favoured collectively owned enterprises. During this period, private entrepreneurs maintained a tight relationship with the government through affiliations with established state or collectively owned enterprises. In such affiliations, the government had an ownership interest and acted as the protector of the private enterprises. These enterprises are often referred to as 'red hat' enterprises. During the next decade from mid-1980s to mid-1990s, the private sector grew rapidly. Private sector growth was especially encouraged by the 1992 speech of Deng Xiaoping, China's paramount leader at the time, which called for a broadening of market-oriented reforms and the subsequent 14 th Conference of the Chinese Communist Party, which endorsed the vision of building a 'market socialist economy'. During this period, many private enterprises took off their 'red hats' and formed joint-stock cooperatives. Most of the joint-stock cooperatives had no government ownership interests, but private entrepreneurs retained a close relationship with local governments, and local governments actively promoted these businesses in the national market. In 1999, an amendment to the Chinese Constitution came into effect, which recognises private enterprises as an important component of the economy. A further amendment to the Chinese Constitution in 2004 provides the protection of legitimate private property rights. With increased clarity regarding the legal status of private property, government involvement in private enterprises retreated further. Since late 1990s, many jointstock cooperatives have transformed into limited liability companies or join-stock companies.
It appears therefore that the ownership structure of private enterprises in Zhejiang province has evolved with the changing policy environment. Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest that private firms' reliance on both government connections and family ties have weakened as direct involvements of government officials and family members are reduced with the changes of ownership structures over time.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it develops a theoretical model to explain the evolution of private sector ownership structures in Zhejiang province. The model suggests that when the market is immature, a private entrepreneur with management skills tends to partner with someone with government and/or family connections (Guanxi). As the market develops, the ownership share of the entrepreneur tends to increase. Second, we present a case study based on a survey of 296 firms in Ningbo, the second largest city of Zhejiang province, which shows that the perceived importance of both government and family Guanxi declined when markets were perceived to be more stable.
Our theoretical model is an application of the endogenous ownership theory which argues that ownership structure is an endogenous choice that reflects the nature of market environment (Demsetz, 1983) . More directly, our model builds on Tian's (2000) analysis which concludes that private ownership in its pure form may not be optimal in 'transitional and other irregular economic environments, in which economic freedom is constrained and markets are absent, immature, or imperfect' (p.248-249).
Similar to Tian (2000) , we treat Guanxi is a resource that is required in the production process, but that cannot be purchased from an immature market. More generally, Guanxi may be viewed as a network of informal relationships (Lovett et al., 1999; Li, 2002) . In particular, Guanxi involves cultivating personal relationships through the exchange of favours and gifts for the purpose of obtaining goods and services, developing networks of mutual dependence, and creating a sense of obligation and indebtedness (Yang, 1994; Xin and Pearce, 1996; Lovett et al., 1999; Schlevogt, 2001; Sun and Wong, 2002) .
Different from Tian, we consider two types of Guanxi. One is government Guanxi which centres on cultivating personal relationships with government officials (Yang, 1994 (Yang, , 2002 Wank, 1996; Guthrie, 1998) . Another is family Guanxi, which refers to the trusting relationship between family members and friends. The natural ties between family members are present in all cultures, as Smith (1759) observed, 'every man … is first and principally recommended to his own care ... after himself, the members of his own family … are naturally the objectives of his warmest affections. They are naturally and usually the persons upon whose happiness or misery his conduct must have the greatest influence.' (p.219) While family Guanxi involves mostly extended family members, it has an extraordinary capacity to reach beyond family members to friends and acquaintances (Sun and Wong, 2002) . Family Guanxi, like government Guanxi, is also treated as an ability to obtain necessary inputs for successful production that cannot be readily acquired through ordinary market transactions.
Apart from having two types of Guanxi, our theoretical model differs from Tian (2000) in an important way. Namely, we discuss the optimal ownership arrangements from the perspective of the entrepreneurs who has superior management ability, and attempts to explain the evolution of the private sector ownership structure as a result of entrepreneurs pursuing profits. In contrast, Tian (2000) discusses the optimal ownership from a benevolent government's perspective and considers what the desirable ownership structure should be if the government could impose the optimal structure from above.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model that explains the features of private sector growth in Zhejiang province of China. Section 3 contains an empirical analysis that investigates perceived importance of Guanxi in different market environments in Ningbo city. Section 4 concludes.
The Model

The Setup of the Model
Consider two agents: Agent 1 is a private entrepreneur with superior management ability (M) while Agent 2 possesses Guanxi (G), an ability to obtain resources that cannot be bought from the market. The production process requires both M and G and one unit of capital investment (k=1 
The use of M and G in the production process is time-consuming, and each agent has one unit of time that can be allocated between production and alternative activities. Since Agent 1 has inferior G relative to Agent 2, it is assumed that one hour of Agent 1's time devoted to G is equivalent to only a fraction λ ( 0 1 λ < < ) of one hour devoted to G by Agent 2. The income from alternative activities of agent i is exogenous and is given by i
Following Tian (2000) , we assume that given M and G, the firm's profit function is: 
Optimal arrangement choice
Agent 1 can establish a firm by choosing one of two organizational forms: (1) the non-cooperative arrangement, in which Agent 1 runs the firm by himself; or (2) the cooperative arrangement, in which Agent 1 runs the firm jointly with Agent 2. If Agent 1 chooses the non-cooperative arrangement, he makes one unit of capital investment, and allocates his time between management, Guanxi, and his alternative activity in order to maximize his expected income. Given the profit function (1), Agent 1's decision problem is:
where
Solving this problem we obtain Agent 1's income function under non-cooperative arrangement:
(
If Agent 1 chooses the cooperative arrangement, he will own the firm jointly with Agent 2. We assume that they share the profit according to some ratio, determined by their relative bargaining power. Let θ ( 0 1 θ ≤ ≤ ) be the profit share of Agent 1, then Agent 1's income is determined by:
Solving this problem, we obtain Agent 1's reaction function:
Meanwhile, Agent 2's income is determined by:
Solving this problem we obtain Agent 2's reaction function:
Assuming an interior Nash equilibrium, we have
Suppose Agent 1 has superior bargaining power, he would set Agent 2's remuneration level at (or slightly above) Agent 2's opportunity income (Eswaran and Kotwal, 1985) . In other words, Agent 1's expected income is the joint profit of both Agent 1 and Agent 2, less the opportunity income of Agent 2, which is 
Having determined Agent 1's income under the non-cooperative and cooperative arrangements, the optimal arrangement is the one that gives Agent 1 a higher income. From equations (3) and (9), we derive the income difference of Agent 1 under two alternative ownership arrangements: . Proposition 1 suggests that during the early stages of private sector development, cooperative ownership arrangements would dominate noncooperative ones. As the market matures, noncooperative ownership structure will gradually be favoured by entrepreneurs. This result is consistent with the prevalence of 'red hat' firms in the period between late 1970s to mid 1980s, and later the dropping red hats and the growth of large private firms in recent years.
Given the corporate structure, we can solve the optimal profit share of Agent 1 (the entrepreneur), θ *, that maximises Agent 1's income, which is:
Clearly, the optimal share θ * depends on the relative importance of management ability 1 α and Guanxi 2 α , and the degree of market perfection ρ . Differentiating (11) with respect to ρ, we have ( ) 
Inequality (12) gives us
Proposition 2. The optimal profit share of the entrepreneur with management ability increases as the market environment improves.
Proposition 2 is consistent with the tendency of many employee-joint-stock cooperatives in Zhejiang province, where ownership interests have become increasingly concentrated in the hands of managers (Sun, 2000) .
The results of our model reflect the insight of endogenous ownership theory that the optimal ownership structure is influenced by the quality of market environment. These results are also broadly consistent with the features of the development of private enterprises in Zhejiang province, namely that the ownership structure choices are influenced by the market environment, and that there are signs that private entrepreneurs' reliance on government and family Guanxi is weakening. In the next section, we present an empirical analysis to investigate how the perceived importance of government and family Guanxi change with different market environment.
Empirical Analysis
Model specification
We specify the following models to investigate how market environment may influence private entrepreneurs' perceptions about the importance of government and family Guanxi, respectively. Gg and G f in the above equations denote the importance of government Guanxi and family Guanxi, respectively, as perceived by private entrepreneurs.
Gg
Age in both equations indicates the lengths of the time the firms have been operating as registered private enterprises. It may be argued older firms are more likely to be more reliant on government connections, and less reliant on lateral connections through family and friends. If this argument is correct, we would expect β 1g to be positive and β 1f to be negative.
lnAsset is a measure of firm size. Wank (1996) argues that firm size is irrelevant to government Guanxi because Chinese firms do not reinvest profits in existing firms, but into new firms linked to the parent firm through overlapping kinship ties of management and ownership. This creates business groups that embody sizeable investments, even though the size of any one member firm is small. Xin and Pearce (1996) also find that firm size does not affect the importance of government Guanxi. We conjecture that since larger firms need government Guanxi to secure bank loans, they may perceive government Guanxi as being more important than small firms. That is, we expect β 2g to be positive. As for family Guanxi, Schlevogt (2001) finds that the decision of many private firms to remain small is driven by their emphasis on family Guanxi. That is, firms choose to be small because the entrepreneurs prefer to have respected and trusted family members as main shareholders. This suggests that small firms are more likely to regard family Guanxi as more important than large firms.
Instability is a measure of the quality of the market environment, which is the key variable we are interested in. Our theoretical model suggests that government and family Guanxi are likely to be more important when the market is immature. Therefore we expect β 3g and β 3f to be positive.
Gift in equation (13a) indicates whether a firm gives gifts to government officials in order to enhance connections. In gift-giving an entrepreneur offers a material reward, but not a fee-for-service bribe because the gift is usually offered without an explicit demand for a return (Wank, 1996) . Instead, gift-giving provides the entrepreneur with an intangible future claim for the government officials' support. Gift-giving is considered to be a good investment in government Guanxi that enhances bureaucratic protection of private firms in an uncertain environment (Yang, 1994 (Yang, , 2002 Xin and Pearce, 1996; Wank, 1996; Guthrie, 1998). We expect a positive correlation between gift-giving and a firm's perceived importance of government Guanxi. In contrast, family Guanxi, which is unusually strong and prevalent in Chinese private enterprises (Whyte, 1995; Schlevogt, 2001) , is not affected by gift-giving, therefore the gift-giving variable is not included in the specification of family Guanxi.
Data
The survey was administrated by the first author in Ningbo between December 2009 and February 2010. With the assistance from the Ningbo's Bureau of Industrial and Commercial Administration and the Association of Ningbo's Private Enterprises, 500 copies of questionnaires were distributed to privately enterprises, 337 (67%) copies of the questionnaires were collected, of which 296 (74%) could be used in our analysis. Of the 296 firms, 5 (1.7%) firms had been state-owned enterprises which were privatised, 63 (21.3%) had been transformed from collective-owned enterprises; the remaining 228 (77.03%) were green-field private firms. In addition to the survey, the first author also conducted in-depth interviews with the owners of 4 private firms that participated in the survey on the importance of government and family Guanxi.
No firm in the sample had government ownership interest at the time of the survey although 20 of them did when they started their operations. 283 (95.6%) of the firms were family controlled (family owned least 50% of the shares). The sector distribution of the 296 firms corresponds with the sector distribution of privately-run enterprises in Ningbo as a whole, as shown in Table  1 . The variables in equation (13a) and (13b) are measured as follows and their descriptive statistics are reported in Table 2 . (1) The perceived importance of government Guanxi (Gg) is measured by a five-point scale with 1= "not helpful at all," 2= "relatively not helpful," 3= "neutral," 4= "relatively helpful," 5= "very helpful." Similarly, the perceived importance of family Guanxi (Gf ) is also measured by the same scale. From Table 2 , we see that the mean of government and family Guanxi were 3.79 and 3.80 respectively, indicating that government and family Guanxi were viewed by private firms in the sample as almost of equal importance, which is consistent with our theoretical model which treats government and family Guanxi as being equally important.
(2) Firm age (Age). This variable measures the age of the firm at the time of the survey. As shown in Table 2 , the average age of firms in the sample was 8.5 years at the end of 2008, indicating that most private firms were established after the ownership reform in 1997.
(3) Firm size (LnAsset). This variable is measured by the natural logarithm of annual average total assets over the past three years.
(4) Instability of market environment (Instability). This variable is measured by the standard deviation of changes in sales revenue over the past three years. It is not a direct measure of the quality of the market environment. However, give the difficulty in measuring the quality of the market environment conceptually and empirically, we choose this measure for two main reasons. Firstly, sales revenue is closely related to the level of uncertainty in the market; and secondly, private entrepreneurs' perception of the quality of the market environment is strongly influenced by recent events that they experienced and their actions are guided by their perceptions. An obvious drawback of the measure is that sales revenue is also determined by factors other than market environment. As shown in Table 2 , the instability indicator in the sample was quite large with a mean of 131, indicating that the market environment was considerably unstable.
(5) Gift-giving (Gift). Each respondent was asked "Do you give gifts to government officials in order to build connections?" If the answer is yes, then Gift is set to be 1; otherwise it is set to be 0.
Estimation and results
We first deal with 3 potential problems in our estimation: multicollineariry, heteroskedasticity, and endogeneity.
As shown in Table 3 , all simple correlations between any two variables in the sample are all smaller than of 0.6, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a concern that requires remedy (Gujarati, 1995) . However, heteroskedasticity may be a problem since there are large differences among the firms (in terms of age, size etc.) in our survey. In order to avoid this potential problem, we employ a robust technique with White's heteroskedastic consistent z-statistics in both ordered logit models.
Another potential problem is that the giftgiving variable may be endogenous in the government Guanxi equation (equation 13a), that is, the perception of the importance of government Guanxi may determine whether a firm gives gifts or not. To find out whether there is an endogeneity problem, we employ Hausman's specification error test. The test is reported in Table 4 , where model (b) refers to the government Guanxi model without the gift-giving variable and model (B) refers to the government Guanxi model with the gift-giving variable. Our diagnostic testing shows that the difference in coefficients between models (b) and (B) fits the asymmetric assumptions, indicating that the coefficients in the government Guanxi model with the gift-giving variable are consistent and efficient. Therefore, gift-giving (Gift) is not an endogenous variable in the government Guanxi model. Having dealt with the potential statistical problems, we estimate the two ordered logit models specified in equations (13a) and (13b). The results are reported in Tables 5 and 6 . (4) 43.05 Prob>chi2 0.0000 Notes: a, b, c stand for significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. z-statistics are in parentheses. Notes: a, b, c stand for significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. z-statistics are in parentheses.
Firm age (Age) has an insignificant effect on the perceived importance of government Guanxi, but has a significant and negative effect on the perceived importance of family Guanxi, suggesting that younger firms attach more importance to family Guanxi than older firms. This is consistent with the argument that older firms, having experienced the 'red-hat' phenomenon, consider government Guanxi to be more important.
Firm size (lnAsset) has a significant and positive effect on the perceived importance of government Guanxi, but has no significant effect on family Guanxi. This is consistent with our conjecture that larger firms attach more importance to government Guanxi because they have a greater need for government support in obtaining bank loans. It may also be the case that larger firms can establish stronger government Guanxi and therefore perceive it to be more important. For instance, Sun and Wong (2002) suggest that private firms need to get involved in government-sponsored projects such as the "Hope Project" and the "Glorious Program" [5] because this may generate, as Wank [5] The objective of the 'Hope Project' is to improve basic education in remote villages while the objective of the 'Glorious Program' is to develop western China. They are both organized by the Chinese government.
(1996) put it, "mutual understanding" or "mutual concern" between the government and private firms. Small firms have more difficulty in building government connections as they are less visible to the government. As the owner of one small private firm in our survey stated:
Every enterprise has to establish all kinds of links with the government. We do this to advance our business interests and during the early period of the reforms, we need government connections to protect our investment because private firms were not formally recognised by the government. However, we have many difficulties in communicating with the government, as in the old saying 'we present the pig-head but the temple does not accept it' (Tizhezhutoumeimiaojin). [6] That is, the government does not really care about us. (Personal interview in Ningbo, 2009) [6] In this expression, the 'pig-head' refers to gifts and favors while the 'temple' refers to authorities such as the government.
Instability of the market environment (Instability) has a significant and positive effect on the perceived importance of government Guanxi and family Guanxi, confirming our expectation that the importance of both government and family Guanxi in the production process declines as the market environment improves.
There is a positive and significant effect of giftgiving (Gift) on the perceived importance of government Guanxi, which means that those firms who give gifts to government officials to build connections are likely to regard government Guanxi as being more important. This is consistent with our expectation.
Although the improvement of the market environment has a dampening effect on the perceived importance of government Guanxi and family Guanxi, private firms still view both Guanxi as being quite useful. As an owner-manager of one private firm in our survey stated:
Government Guanxi matters for getting things done in our business. In the past we relied on government Guanxi to obtain some advantages such as obtaining raw materials. Nowadays, a good relationship with the government can enhance business in the market because the government still dominates almost every aspect of our business. At present the importance of government Guanxi may decline in some social domains, but flourish in new areas … (Personal interview in Ningbo, 2009) This view is echoed by another manager of a green-field private firm:
Government Guanxi is very important everywhere in China because the government controls state contracts, banks loans, access to imports, favourable tax incentives, access to valuable market information, exemptions from troublesome laws and regulations, and so on … We hope, however, that we can do our business relying on market rules instead of the government. (Personal interview in Ningbo, 2009) To understand private firm's perceptions about the current and future role of the government in their businesses, we included in our survey the question: 'what is the main role that the government has been playing and the role that you expect the government will play in the future within your firm?' The responses are reported in Table 7 . Unfortunately the question does not distinguish the government's current role and expected future role. 91 firms (30.7% of the sample) reported that the most important role for government Guanxi was to provide 'technological support and services'. This probably reflects private firms' expectations that government would move away from direct involvement in firms' business activities, and focus on providing social services. 59 firms (19.9% of the sample) reported that the most important role for government Guanxi was to facilitate 'access to financial resources'. This appears to support the argument by Sun and Wong (2002) that the government is important in providing access to bank loans. 57 firms (19.3%) considered government Guanxi to be important for 'protection', suggesting that government Guanxi acted as an insurance against institutional uncertainty. In our survey we also asked respondents the question: 'what is the main role that family members have been playing or will play in your firm?' The results are reported in Table 8 . Overall 152 firms reported that the most important role of family Guanxi was to 'provide cheap and flexible resources such as capital and labour', accounting for 51.4% of the sample. This was a main reason why family businesses account for the majority of private firms, and also the fact that most firms are small because private resources are relatively limited (Sun and Wong, 2002) . 74 firms, accounting for 25% of the sample, considered that the most important role of family Guanxi was to 'extend the firm's network of connections outside the firm'. This supports the argument that although family-centred, family Guanxi is an important avenue to extend networks of the firm (Sun and Wong, 2002) . Altogether 62 firms, accounting for 21% of the sample, considered that family Guanxi 'assist in decision making within the firm', which suggests that family ties may reduce conflicts among decision makers, thereby making it easier to reach consensus.
Conclusion
In this paper we have developed a theoretical model to study two features of the spontaneous growth of private enterprises in China's Zhejiang province, namely that the ownership structure appears to be strongly influenced by the quality of market environment, and that private firms' reliance on government Guanxi and family Guanxi seems to have weakened over time. The theoretical model suggests that when the market is immature or unstable, the ownership structure of a typical private enterprise involves a cooperative arrangement between a party with management skills (the entrepreneur) and another party with government and/or family Guanxi. As the market environment improves, the importance of both types of Guanxi declines. This result is consistent with our empirical analysis based on a survey of 296 firms in Ningbo city in Zhengjiang province, which shows that the perceived importance of both government and family Guanxi declined with improvements in market stability.
It should be noted that all the firms surveyed are 100% privately owned, thus the use of government Guanxi is not through government's ownership interests as in our theoretical model, but through other channels such as gift-giving. Data limitations do not allow us to directly test the relationship between ownership structure and institutional quality. However, the fact that private firms have shunned away from maintaining government Guanxi through conceding ownership interests to the government is itself an indication of the waning importance of government Guanxi. From our empirical result that the perceived importance of government and family Guanxi have declined with the increased stability of the market, one may infer that private firms would invest less in building connection and more in productive activities as the market environment improves.
Despite the tendency for the importance of government and family Guanxi to fall, currently both types of Guanxi are considered to be very useful, notably in gaining access to finance resources. In future research it would be interesting to investigate the impact of financial sector reforms on ownership structure and the perceived importance of government and family Guanxi in private enterprises.
Dear Sir or Madam, Thank you for your help with this study. Please answer all questions as accurately as possible. We guarantee the confidentiality of your answers. Your cooperation is highly appreciated.
In the following questionnaire, please circle your choice or complete your answers on the line as appropriate (the unit of amount is RMB 10 thousand). 
